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Unilateral Burdens and Third-Party Harms:
Abortion Conscience Laws as Policy Outliers
NADIA N. SAWICKI*
Most conscience laws establish nearly absoluteprotectionsfor health careproviders
unwilling to participatein abortion. Providers'rights to refuse and relatedly, their
immunity from civil liability, employment discrimination, and other adverse
consequences are often unqualified, even in situations where patients are likely to
be harmed. These laws impose unilateral burdens on third parties in an effort to
protect the rights of conscientious refusers. As such, they are outliers in the universe
offederal and state anti-discriminationand religiousfreedom statutes, all of which
strike a more even balance between individual rights and the prevention of harm to
third parties. This Article argues that state abortion conscience laws should
incorporatelimitations similar to those established in the Civil Rights Act and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct in order to minimize risks to thirdpartieswho might
be harmed by provider refusals.
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INTRODUCTION

Claims of personal and institutional conscience are having an increasing impact
on the delivery and financing of health care services in the United States. The most
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prominent example may be religious employers' opposition to the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate, which resulted in years
of litigation and extensive administrative rulemaking.1 However, from the
perspective of direct patient access to medical services, it is impossible to overstate
the impact of state and federal conscience laws that codify health care providers'
rights to refuse medical services on grounds of conscience and relieve them of the
consequences of those refusals. 2
A recent empirical study of procedural protections in state reproductive
conscience laws demonstrates the breadth of these laws.3 In many states, the
conscience protections offered to providers are absolute with no consideration
given to the burdens they may impose on patients, employers, or other third parties.4
Among the forty-six states that protect individual and institutional health care
providers' right to refuse participation in abortion, twenty-six impose no limitations
on refusal rights.5 Thirteen states limit rights of refusal in cases where a patient is in
need of emergency medical treatment. 6 Other meaningful patient protections-for
example, referral obligations or duties to provide information about access to
services-are rare.7 Even more strikingly, the majority of states immunize providers
from civil liability for their conscience-driven refusals, prohibiting patients from
bringing tort suits to recover for their injuries.8
These state laws also impose significant burdens on hospitals and other health
care organizations that employ objecting physicians, nurses, and others. Most states
prohibit employers from taking adverse action against those who refuse to participate

1. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Little Sisters of the
Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). Further evidence
comes from recent attempts at expanding the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) Office of Civil Rights authority to investigate claims of conscience-based
discrimination against health care providers. HHS Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in
Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 45 C.F.R. 88 (2019). In response to several legal
challenges, HHS agreed to delay implementation of these new rules. Press Release, City Att'y
of S.F., HerreraForces Trump Administration to Back Down on DiscriminatoryHealth Care
Rule (June 28, 2019), https://www.sfcityattomey.org/2019/06/28/herrera-forces-trump-

[https://perma.cc/33JAadministration-to-back-down-on-discriminatory-health-care-rule
EWED]. In late 2019, two federal courts vacated the rule; appeals have been filed in both
cases. New York v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 414 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y.
2019); Washington v. Azar, 426 F. Supp. 3d 704 (E.D. Wash. 2019).
2. See generallyNadia N. Sawicki, The Conscience Defense to Malpractice, 108 CALIF.

L. REV. 1255 (2020).
3. Id.; Nadia N. Sawicki, Procedural Protections in Reproductive Health Care
Conscience Laws, THE POLICY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, http://lawatlas.org/datasets

/procedural-protections-in-reproductive-health-care-conscience-laws [https://perma.cc/6KT3
-UXKT].
4. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1278.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1280.
7. Id. at 1282.
8. Thirty-seven states have statutory civil immunity provisions. Id. at 1275-76.
Legislation in the remaining nine states with abortion refusal laws is silent as to the issue of
civil immunity but would likely be interpreted by a court to prohibit tort suits by patients. Id.
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in abortion,) and only three states limit individual providers' right to refuse in cases
where accommodating the refusal would cause undue hardship to their employer.
Several federal statutes and regulations also protect conscientious refusal rights
in the abortion context.11 Like most state laws, almost all of these federal laws appear
to provide absolute protections for individual and/or institutional health care
providers who decline to participate in abortions. 12 Of these federal laws, only the

9. Twenty-six states explicitly prohibit adverse action by employers; thirty states
prohibit "disciplinary action," which may be taken by employers, state agents, or others. Id. at
1274.
10. IDAHO CODE § 18-611(3) (2016) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to
discriminate against any health care professional based upon his or her declining to provide a
health care service that violates his or her conscience, unless the employer can demonstrate
that such accommodation poses an undue hardship."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-728c (West
2016) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees by refusing to
reasonably accommodate religious observance in the context of abortion, "unless the employer
can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the program,
enterprise, or business of the employer"); 16 PA. CODE § 51.44(c) (requiring employers to
make "reasonable accommodations" for refusing employees, defined as accommodations that
"may be made without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer's business," and
identifying as examples of such hardship cases where "the employe's [sic] needed work cannot
be performed by another employe [sic] of substantially similar qualifications in the situation
where and at the time when the person refuses to perform or participate in the performance of
abortion or sterilization procedures or where the employe [sic] refuses to perform his normally
assigned duties incident to employment").
11. See, e.g., Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)-(b)(1) (protecting
physicians and physician training programs that decline to receive or offer training in abortion
from government discrimination); id. § 300a-7(b) (prohibiting public actors from requiring
individuals and entities receiving federal funding to perform or participate in abortion or
sterilization); id. and 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)-(e) (protecting physicians, health care personnel,
and students from adverse action for their refusal to perform abortion or sterilization
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, § 508 (prohibiting
federal funds from going to federal and state agencies and programs that discriminate against
entities that decline to participate in abortion); Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1688
(noting that the law does not "require or prohibit any person, or public or private entity, to
provide .

.

. any .

.

. service, including the use of facilities, related to an abortion"); Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(4) (prohibiting insurers from
discriminating against providers and facilities that refuse to provide abortion); 48 C.F.R. §
1609.7001(c)(7) (noting that health care providers "are not required to discuss treatment
options that . . . are inconsistent with their . . . ethical, moral or religious beliefs"). Note that
some federal conscience laws also offer positive protections for providers who affirmatively
choose to participate in abortion. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(c) (stating that anti-discrimination
provisions are applicable to anyone who "performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful
sterilization procedure or abortion" or "refused to perform or assist in the performance of such
a procedure" on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions); Civil Rights Restoration
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1688 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require or prohibit any
person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any benefit or service .. . related to an
abortion.").
12. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social
Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific
Exemptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 703, 714 (2014) (stating that the Church Amendment
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's (PPACA) provisions relating to
insurance coverage for abortion services set limits on conscience rights, withdrawing
provider protections in cases where patients are in need of emergency treatment. 13
Abortion conscience laws that establish unqualified protections are outliers in the
universe of federal and state laws that are aimed at preventing discrimination and/or
accommodating those with religious or other limitations. Laws like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and many others explicitly acknowledge that rights to personal
accommodation cannot be absolute." In an effort to protect third parties who might
be impacted by these accommodations, these laws set various limits-whether
limiting religious accommodations in cases where employers are likely to suffer
undue hardship, limiting rights to accommodation of disability if necessary to protect
direct harm, or balancing religious protections against the compelling interests of the
state. Many other state laws that protect conscience and religious freedom-such as
health care decision-making acts and school immunization laws-also set limits on
the rights of individuals seeking accommodation."
This Article demonstrates that unqualified abortion conscience laws that impose
unilateral burdens on third parties affected by provider refusals stand in stark contrast
to these other legal protections. It argues that abortion conscience laws should be
amended to better balance the rights of refusing providers against the interests of
patients, hospitals, and other third parties who might be harmed as a result of a
conscience-driven refusal. This Article proposes that this process be informed by the

protects providers even when their refusals would "impose a hardship on women").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(d) (stating that the law does not relieve health care providers from
federal or state emergency treatment requirements, including the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)). Note that although other federal conscience
statutes are silent with respect to conscience rights in emergency circumstances, at least one
court has held that federal conscience protections were not intended to override EMTALA's
emergency treatment obligations. New Yorkv. United States DepartmentofHealth andHuman

Services concerned a challenge to an HHS rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
conscience. 414 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The court held that the rule was
impermissible because it "creates, via regulation, a conscience exception to EMTALA's
statutory mandate." Id. at 538. In defending the rule, the federal government had argued that
the EMTALA conflict arose not from the rule itself, but from substantive provisions in the
underlying conscience statutes (like the Church Amendment). Id. The court, however, rejected
this claim, stating that there is no evidence that Congress intended for federal conscience
statutes to override EMTALA. "On the contrary, there is affirmative evidence that the sponsors
of each of the Church, Coats-Snowe, and Weldon Amendments did not intend for these to
require providers, in an emergency, to be obliged to accommodate an objecting employee."
Id. (emphasis in original). Based on this reasoning, some might argue that even when there are
no explicit emergency exceptions in the statutory text of federal or state conscience laws, they
should nevertheless be interpreted as incorporating EMTALA's emergency treatment duties.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, setting limits on conscience protections only in cases of
patient emergency is likely insufficient to protect many patients from harm. Sawicki, supra
note 2, at 1301-04.
14. See infra Sections II.B.1 (CRA), II.B.2 (ADA), II.A (RFRA), II.C (HCDAs), II.D
(immunization).

15. See id.
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standards and limitations already established in various other state and federal antidiscrimination laws. Introducing such standards into the statutory language of
abortion conscience laws is a workable and politically supportable mechanism for
balancing the burdens experienced by refusing providers and those third parties
affected by their refusals.
Part I of this Article identifies the primary issue of concern: how best to balance
individual health care providers' right to refuse to participate in abortion, a medical
service they consider morally objectionable, against the interests of third parties who
are impacted by those refusals. Part II compares abortion conscience laws with
several federal and state laws that set greater limits on rights to accommodation and
analyzes whether imposing such limitations in the abortion context would be
feasible. Part III proposes incorporating the undue hardship standard and direct threat
limitation of the Civil Rights Act and Americans with Disabilities Act into state
abortion conscience laws. It demonstrates that such an approach would, in many
cases, protect third parties affected by individual and institutional refusals without
withdrawing rights to accommodation altogether. Finally, Part IV highlights another
key difference between abortion conscience laws and the accommodation laws
described in Part II-only abortion conscience laws protect providers from civil
liability if their refusal to participate in abortion causes injury to a patient or other
third party. In almost no other context do we see this strong form of provider
protection. Eliminating civil liability protections in abortion conscience laws would
better serve to protect patient interests and, moreover, would harmonize these laws
with the vast majority of other federal and state accommodation laws.
I. BALANCING CONSCIENCE RIGHTS AND THIRD-PARTY PROTECTIONS
Debates about the appropriate scope of health care conscience protections have
been ongoing for decades. Many scholars and policymakers believe that health care
providers ought to receive some legal protections for their conscience-driven actions,
while also acknowledging that these protections cannot be unlimited. 16 Academic

16. See, e.g., Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered
Care andLimitations on the Right To Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE

L. REV. 141, 182 (2010) (arguing that conscientious refusal laws "should not make
exceptions to the few patient protective duties that institutions do have under generally
applicable law, such as the duty to provide emergency care in certain circumstances or the
duty not to abandon patients, because such exceptions simply shift legal responsibility for the
harms that result from refusals from the institution to the patient"); Wilson, supra note 12, at
762 ("Qualifying conscience protections by substantial and palpable . . hardship to the public
avoids the need to default to a for-the-patient-to-win-the-objector-must-lose posture.").

MARIA
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writing in the fields of medicine," philosophy and medical ethics, 18 law, 19 and
religion 20 is often aimed at determining how best to strike a balance between rights
of conscientious refusal and the need for patient protection.
Currently, however, most conscience laws applicable in the abortion context
typically impose unilateral burdens-they establish protections for refusing health
care providers, hospitals, and insurers but only rarely establish mechanisms for
ensuring that these refusals do not cause harm to third parties. 21 As a result, the
consequences of conscientious refusals are borne not by the refusing providers but
by others. 22 For example, employers and institutions with which a refusing provider
is affiliated are burdened with a duty to ensure patient access to care while
accommodating the individual provider's refusal. Patients requesting care from
refusing providers are burdened with finding alternative providers willing to offer
the services they require. In worst-case scenarios, patients who are denied medically
necessary abortions may suffer serious physical injuries while also being denied the
opportunity to secure a legal remedy. 23
Noted legal scholars have criticized abortion conscience laws for not considering
the doctrine of third-party harm.24 Primarily attributed to First Amendment scholars,

17. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience
Refusing to Deliver
Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471 (2005); Lisa H. Harris, Recognizing Conscience
in Abortion Provision, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981 (2012); Julian Savulescu, Conscientious
Objection in Medicine, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 294 (2006); Douglas B. White & Baruch Brody,
Would Accommodating Some Conscientious Objections by Physicians Promote Quality in

Medical Care?, 305 JAMA 1804 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser, Freedom of Conscience, Professional Responsibility,
and Access to Abortion, 22 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 280 (1994); HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH,
CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE (2008); MARK
R. WICCLAIR, CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTION IN HEALTH

CARE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2011).

19. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: WhatAre They and When Should
They Be Accommodated?, 9 AvE MARIA L. REv. 47 (2010); Richard S. Myers, On the Need
for a Federal Conscience Clause, 1 NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 23 (2001); Lynn D. Wardle,
Protection of Health-CareProviders'Rights of Conscience in American Law: Present, Past,
and Future, 9 AVE MARIA L. REv. 1 (2010); Wilson, supra note 12.
20. See, e.g., Maureen Kramlich, Coercing Conscience: The Effort to Mandate Abortion
as a Standardof Care, 4 NAT'L. CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 29 (2004); Edmund D. Pellegrino, The
Physician'sConscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious Belief A Catholic Perspective,
30 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 221 (2002).
21. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1278-83.
22. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-BasedConscience

Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2542 (2015) ("[H]ealthcare refusal laws
make little or no effort to offset their impact on third parties."); see Maxine N. Harrington,
The Ever-ExpandingHealth Care Conscience Clause: The Questfor Immunity in the Struggle

Between Professional Duties andMoral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 779, 781-82 (2007)
("Little effort has been made to achieve a reasonable balance between providers' and patients'
interests. In most cases, the legislation recognizes an absolute right to refuse to provide health
care, which destroys any equilibrium between these two competing interests.").
23. See generally Sawicki, supra note 2.
24. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party Harms:
Constitutional Values and Limits, 106 KY. L.J. 717, 727 (2017) (arguing that policymakers

should "seek solutions that avoid or minimize burdens on both religious believers and third
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the third-party harm doctrine posits that religious accommodations and/or
exemptions may be unconstitutional when they result in significant harm to third
parties.25 In this Article, I do not take a position on whether the third-party harm
doctrine is a viable interpretation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, or on the
constitutionality of religious exemptions in general. Rather, this Article addresses the
normative question of how policymakers crafting discretionary exemptions 26 from
generally applicable laws should balance the interests of those whose beliefs they
seek to protect against those who might be negatively impacted by such exemptions.
Whatever one's position on the constitutional question, it is impossible for
policymakers to consider laws aimed at accommodating religious and conscientious
believers without also considering the effects of these laws on third parties.27

&

parties to the greatest extent possible. Solutions that take both sets of concerns into account
are preferable to approaches that focus on one set at the expense of the other."); Nejaime
Siegel, supra note 22 (demonstrating that complicity-based conscience claims negatively
impact third parties outside the faith community and arguing for limitations on legal
accommodation of such claims); Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Richard
Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781, 810-11 (2017) ("Even if we are
committed to protective doctrines . . . we should still be concerned about who pays for the
costs of harmful rights" and suggesting that it may be preferable to "'uncouple' protection of
a right from the harms it imposes on others."); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the
Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REv. 871, 940-42 (2019)
(describing examples where political effort has "soften[ed] some of the harder edges" of
proposed legislative accommodations that would harm third parties); Wilson, supra note 12,
at 758 (identifying the key question in these debates as "not whether anyone can be harmed
- someone, somewhere may well be harmed in the abstract - but whether exemptions can
be tailored to mute the impact on the public while also respecting religious liberty").
25. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 24, at 721-22 (discussing whether Establishment Clause
jurisprudence permits religious accommodations that impose significant third-party burdens);
Carl H. Esbeck, Do DiscretionaryReligious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?,
106 KY. L.J. 603 (2017) (distinguishing constitutional analysis between cases involving
religious exemptions and religious preferences); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions,
Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1375 (2016)
(arguing that third-party harms are constitutionally relevant, and identifying factors relevant
to judicial decision-making); Schwartzman, Tebbe & Schragger, supra note 24 (challenging
six major objections to the third-party harm principle); Storslee, supra note 24 (rejecting the
third-party harm doctrine as an interpretation of the Establishment Clause and arguing instead
that the Establishment Clause only prohibits government attempts to promote a favored
religious identity).
26. Policymakers have great discretion to create religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws. See Brady, supra note 24, at 720 (explaining that under the Free Exercise
precedent of Smith, "when burdens result from neutral, generally applicable laws, whether or
not to grant relief is a legislative decision"); id. at 723-24 (noting that the question of how to
consider third-party burdens when crafting religious accommodations is both a normative
question and a constitutional question).
27. See Schwartzman, Tebbe & Schragger, supra note 24, at 810-11 (identifying as
options for protecting religious freedom while avoiding third-party harm: "(1) protect[ing] the
right and impos[ing] costs on third parties or (2) restrict[ing] the right and avoid imposing
costs on third parties," as well as alternative options that "'uncouple' protection of a right from
the harms it imposes on others by requiring the public to compensate those who are harmed,"
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SEEKING BALANCE: TAKING CUES FROM FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION IN
OTHER CONTEXTS

While abortion conscience laws are fairly one-sided in their protections, antidiscrimination and religious accommodation laws in many other contexts explicitly
recognize and protect against the possibility of third-party harm. Federal and state
laws protecting religious exercise, conscientious belief, and even disability all set
clear limits on how far the right to personal accommodation extends. While these
laws take a variety of approaches to balancing individual rights and public interests,
they all recognize that protections for individual rights cannot be absolute and
establish standards for determining the boundaries of these protections.
Many of these limiting standards have been in place for decades and have survived
in the face of political and legal challenges. Others, as in the case of school
immunization laws, have been amended fairly recently in response to pressing
concerns about risks to third parties. 28 Given that these limitations all have significant
public and political support, it is reasonable to consider them as possibilities in the
context of conscience protections for health care providers opposed to abortion.
Indeed, the risks of third-party harm resulting from provider refusals may be even
greater than in some of these other contexts, given that health care providers have a
monopoly on providing medical care to support patient health and safety. 29
This Section examines several federal and state laws that establish individual
accommodations while also setting limits to protect third parties from harm-from
the more general to the most restrictive. It analyzes whether these limits could be
similarly applied to abortion conscience laws and evaluates which limits might
translate most comfortably to this context. This analysis will provide valuable
guidance to the many state and federal policymakers who are considering
amendments to their abortion laws, many of which include conscience protections. 30

such as through social insurance or no-fault compensation).
28. See infra text at notes 146, 150.
29. See R. Alta Charo, Health Care ProviderRefusals to Treat, Prescribe, Refer or

Inform: Professionalism and Conscience, 1 J. AM. CONST. SOC'Y ISSUE GRPS 119, 129-34
(2007) (discussing state licensing of physicians and the implications of medical monopoly
power for rights of conscientious refusal).
30. In 2019, there were several major changes to state and federal conscience laws,
including the Trump administration's expansion of federal authority to investigate claims of
conscience-based discrimination against health care providers. See, e.g., HHS, supra note 1;
H.B. 2495, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (repealing the conscience provisions of
the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975).; H.B. 57, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019)
(prohibiting public entities from restricting health care providers' right to participate in
abortion). In 2020, state legislation imposing restrictions on abortion access proliferated.
NORA ELLMAN, STATE ACTIONS UNDERMINING ABORTION RIGHTS IN 2020 (2020), https://www

.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/08/27/489786/state-actions-underminingabortion-rights-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3NLC-632V].
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A. General Standards:Religious Freedom RestorationAct
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court weakened the First
Amendment's protections of religious freedom when it held that valid and neutral
laws of general applicability that have the incidental effect of burdening religious
exercise are subject only to rational basis review. 31 In direct response to Smith,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), reinstating, by way
of federal statute, the strict scrutiny standard that had been in place prior to Smith.3 2
RFRA prohibits the government from passing even generally applicable laws that
"substantially burden" religious exercise unless it can demonstrate that the laws
further a "compelling governmental interest" and adopt the "least restrictive means"
of furthering that interest. 33 In other words, RFRA provides strong protections for
religious believers, but it sets limits on those protections.
Unlike some of the other limiting standards discussed in this Article, RFRA's
compelling interest test is more of a metastandard. In the context of abortion refusal,
RFRA does not provide direct guidance to health care providers about their rights
and responsibilities. Rather, it is a standard by which legislators and judges can assess
the merits of legislation passed to protect these rights. As such, it is useful to health
care providers and patients seeking to challenge state laws. However, it does not
speak directly to providers seeking guidance about the scope of their obligations in
any particular circumstance, nor does it assist patients seeking to challenge provider
refusals in the moment.
Thus, including a compelling interest / least restrictive alternative test within
abortion conscience laws will not address the practical needs of providers, patients,
or employers. However, legislators could certainly consider this kind of test when
assessing amendments to state conscience laws. To be clear, states are not bound by
RFRA,34 but its guiding principles may be helpful for policymakers seeking to
minimize third-party harms associated with current conscience protections.
Reproductive rights advocates may argue that advising policymakers to follow a
compelling interest / least restrictive alternative standard in adopting or amending
conscience laws will be insufficiently protective of patient rights. After all, the
Supreme Court rejected such a test when assessing the First Amendment claims in
Smith-as a constitutional matter, states may not be required to have health care
conscience protections at all. 35 However, recall that almost every state currently

31. 494 U.S. 872, 878-881 (1990).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2, 2000bb-3, 2000bb-4.
33. Id. § 2000bb-1.
34. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that RFRA is only
constitutional as applied to the federal government, not the states). Note, however, that some
states have their own versions of RFRA. Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REv. 466, 466-67 (2010).
35. See infra note 152 (identifying, in the context of mandatory school immunization,
cases holding that religious and philosophical exemptions are not constitutionally required);
see also Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 572-73 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a
religious exemption to the PPACA contraceptive mandate is not required under RFRA), rev'd
and remandedby Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.
Ct. 2367 (2020) (holding that it was appropriate for the United States to consider RFRA when
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protects health care providers' right to refuse participation in abortion, and that the
majority of states impose no limits or conditions on these rights, offering no
corresponding protections for patients. The fact that most current abortion
conscience laws impose unilateral burdens on third parties suggests that any kind of
limiting principle-even one as broad as the RFRA standard-could be a welcome
change from the perspective of third-party protection.
Admittedly, it is difficult to predict what the consequences might be if an RFRAtype standard were applied to abortion conscience laws. Some insights may be
gleaned, however, from Supreme Court jurisprudence in the contraceptive mandate
cases.
When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was passed in
2010, it included a provision commonly known as the "contraceptive mandate." The
PPACA requires that employee health insurance plans cover preventive services (one
of ten essential health benefits) without cost-sharing payments by insured
individuals. 3 6 In defining the scope of "preventive services," the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) relied on recommendations from the Institute of
Medicine, which defined preventive services as including FDA-approved
contraceptive and sterilization treatments. 37
Backlash was swift among employers with religious objections to contraception
and sterilization, leading to regulatory changes that exempted some employers from
the mandate and established an accommodation for others. 3 8 Nevertheless,
opposition continued.
The Supreme Court's 2014 decision arose from a challenge by Hobby Lobby, a
closely-held, for-profit company that opposed the contraceptive mandate on religious
grounds but was not entitled to an exemption. 39 Applying the RFRA standard, the
Court agreed that the mandate imposed a substantial burden on Hobby Lobby's
freedom of religious exercise." Moreover, the Court concluded that the mandate was
not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in ensuring
broad access to contraceptive services." For example, it noted that the mandate's
goal could be achieved in a less restrictive manner if the accommodation mechanism
for nonprofit "eligible organizations" were extended to companies like Hobby

crafting the religious exemption but reaching no decision on the question of whether RFRA
compelled or authorized the exemption).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-13(a)(4).
37. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725 (2012).
38. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 698-99 (2014) (discussing
exemptions and accommodations established by HHS).
39. Id. at 702-05.
40. Id. at 719-26.
41. See id. at 728-32. Interestingly, the Court declined to adjudicate the issue of whether
the government's interest in ensuring that insured women have access to contraception is a
compelling one; rather, it "assume[d] that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the
four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA." Id. at
728.
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Lobby.4 2 The Court also identified another possible means of achieving the
mandate's goal without burdening objecting employers: it suggested that the U.S.
government could provide contraceptive coverage directly to individuals, bypassing
employer insurance entirely. 4 3
Both of these approaches, according to the Court, could minimize burdens on
objecting employers while nevertheless ensuring broad public access to
contraception. While the Court did not explicitly address the question of whether
Hobby Lobby would have a right to accommodation if that resulted in significant
access issues for employees seeking contraception, its holding effectively
conditioned RFRA protections for refusing employers on the prevention of harms to
third parties. Indeed, academic experts have interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in Hobby Lobby as granting the company the accommodations it had
requested, "but . . on the assumption that there would be no cost to third parties"
other than taxpayers.4 4 The Court did not direct HHS as to how, exactly, it should
modify the contraceptive mandate to achieve this balance. In fact, in a later case, the
Court instructed the parties to find a solution on their own. 4 5
The Court's approach in Hobby Lobby and subsequent cases left a strong
indication that if the parties could find no way to fully accommodate employers'
objections without significantly reducing women's access to contraception,
accommodation might not be required under RFRA. Indeed, that was HHS's
determination shortly after Hobby Lobby was decided-it did not amend its
regulations, because it determined that there was no way to further accommodate
employers without reducing access for employees. 4 6

42. See id. at 730.

43. Id. at 728 (noting that the "most straightforward" and "less restrictive" way of
achieving this goal "would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four
contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their healthinsurance policies due to their employers' religious objections"). Some critics have argued
that there is no doctrinal support for such an approach. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Religious
Liberty Versus Rights of Others, 106 KY. L.J. 651, 658 (2017) (discussing the Court's
suggestion that government-sponsored contraceptive coverage might be a solution to the
RFRA problem, arguing that "[t]hat cannot be the law, and indeed it is not," and opining that
here, "the Court went off the rails in a way unlike anything I can ever recall seeing").
44. Schwartzman, Tebbe & Schragger, supra note 24, at 811.
45. "Given the gravity of the dispute and the substantial clarification and refinement in
the positions of the parties, the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive
at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while at the
same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners' health plans 'receive full and equal
health coverage, including contraceptive coverage."' Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560
(2016). The Court's order also included the following language: "Nothing in this opinion, or
in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to
ensure that women covered by petitioners' health plans 'obtain, without cost, the full range of
FDA approved contraceptives."' Id. at 1560-61 (quoting Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.
Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014)).
46. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part36, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. EMP.
BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN. 4 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa

/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-36.pdf
FM8E].

[https://perma.cc/8MMM-
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However, after Donald Trump was elected president, his administration reversed
course. It expanded the existing exemption to all employers with religious objections
to contraception and made the accommodation process (which would allow
employees to access contraceptives drugs without implicating employers) entirely
optional.4 7 In litigation surrounding these regulatory changes, several federal courts
relied on the Supreme Court's language in Hobby Lobby regarding access to
contraception to enjoin their implementation. Both the Ninth4 8 and Third Circuits4 9
enjoined the new rules in part because they would cause some women to lose
employer-sponsored contraceptive coverage, something the Supreme Court sought
to avoid in Hobby Lobby.
The Third Circuit, in Pennsylvania v. Presidentof the United States, emphasized
that "[t]he Supreme Court has directed that, when considering a requested
accommodation to address the burden, 'courts must take adequate account of the
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries."'" 0 It found
that while the accommodation "fulfills this directive as it provides a means for an
observer to adhere to religious precepts and simultaneously allows women to receive
statutorily-mandated health care coverage,"" the new rules, which make the
accommodation optional, would "impose an undue burden on nonbeneficiaries." 2
The court further cited Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby, where she wrote
that RFRA does not permit "a religion-based exemption when the [A]ccommodation
would be harmful to others-here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage
requirement was designed to protect." 5 3 While the Third Circuit's decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded in 2020, the Supreme
Court's opinion did not speak to the question of third-party harm."
For similar reasons, the Ninth Circuit court in Californiav. Azar enjoined the new
rules on the basis that it was "reasonably probable that women in the plaintiff states
[would] lose some or all employer-sponsored contraceptive coverage due to the

47. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,808 (Oct. 13, 2017); Moral
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017).
48. In Californiav. Azar, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction
against the expanded exemptions in plaintiff states. 911 F.3d 558, 574 (9th Cir. 2018). After a
series of appeals, the injunction was vacated, and this case and several affiliated cases were
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Little Sisters of
the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140

S.

Ct. 2367 (2020). California v.

U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 977 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2020).
49.

In Pennsylvaniav. Presidentof the United States, the Third Circuit affirmed the grant

of a nationwide preliminary injunction. 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019). The decision was

reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court in Little Sisters of the Poor SaintsPeter & Paul
Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2373 (2020).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

930 F.3d at 573 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
Id.
Id. at 574.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 764 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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IFRs," citing federal agencies' own estimates that between 31,700 and 120,000
women would lose contraceptive coverage."
Even the U.S. District for the Northern District of Texas, which held in Deotte v.
Azar that the contraceptive mandate's accommodation process violated RFRA's
protections for religious employers, acknowledged the risk of harm to third parties
when it discussed alternative means of ensuring contraceptive access. 56 The court
reiterated the Supreme Court's assertion that there are likely less restrictive means
of protecting access without infringing on employers' religious liberty. 7
In 2020, in Little Sisters of the Poor, the Supreme Court upheld the Trump
administration's expansion of the religious exemption against procedural
challenges. 58 However, it did not speak to the substantive question of whether an
RFRA analysis ought to consider significant harms to third parties,59 and it declined
to reach any conclusion about whether such harms are likely to occur in this
instance. 60 That said, six Justices (in two concurrences and one dissent) explicitly
called out the impact of these new rules on employees' ability to access
contraception. Justices Alito and Gorsuch, in a concurring opinion, concluded that
the new rules impose no burden on employees. 61 In contrast, Justices Kagan and

&

.

55. 911 F.3d 558, 572 (2018).
56. 393 F. Supp. 3d 490, 514 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (permanently enjoining the contraceptive
mandate, including the accommodation process requiring objecting employers to complete
self-certification forms).
57. Id. at 506-08 (noting that even if the "Government has a compelling interest in
ensuring access to free contraception," it could achieve this interest without "conscripting
religious employers," for example, "[a]s the Supreme Court suggested . . if the Government
itself were to assume the cost and responsibility of a program to ensure free access to
contraception").
58. 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2386 (2020) (holding that the Departments of Health and Human
Services, Labor, and the Treasury had the authority under PPACA to promulgate the religious
and moral exemptions, and that the rules that were promulgated were free from procedural
defects under the Administrative Procedure Act).
59. The Court noted that the "policy concern" of whether the new rule imposes burdens
on employees seeking contraception "cannot justify supplanting the [ACA] text's plain
meaning," but the Court did not speak to whether this concern would be relevant to an RFRA
analysis. Id. at 2381. The Court concluded that it was appropriate for the departments to
consider RFRA when promulgating the new rules, but it expressly declined to reach a
substantive conclusion as to whether the expanded exemption was "compelled [or] . .
authorized" by RFRA (or about how an RFRA analysis might proceed). Id. at 2382.
60. The Court's opinion acknowledged the parties' disagreement about whether the
exemption would make it harder for women to access contraception but expressed no view on
this issue. Id. at 2381. Justices Alito and Gorsuch, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the
new role imposes no burden on employees seeking contraceptive access. Id. at 2396 (Alito, J.
& Gorsuch, J., concurring). In a dissenting opinion, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
concluded that the burdens to employees were significant. Id. at 2408 (Ginsburg, J.
Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
61. "The dissent and the court below suggest that the new rule is improper because it
imposes burdens on the employees of entities that the rule exempts . . .but the rule imposes
no such burden. A woman who does not have the benefit of contraceptive coverage under her
employer's plan is not the victim of a burden imposed by the rule or her employer. She is
simply not the beneficiary of something that federal law does not provide." Id. at 2396 (Alito,
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Breyer in a concurrence,62 and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor in a dissent, 63 all
concluded that the burdens to employees were significant. The fact that six Justices
thought it important to reach substantive conclusions on the issue of third-party harm
suggests that this issue would be highly relevant to a substantive RFRA analysis. 64
In sum, while RFRA's compelling interest / least restrictive alternative standard
would not provide practical guidance if incorporated into the text of state abortion
conscience laws, it would serve as helpful policy guidance for those adopting and
amending such laws. And given the Supreme Court's language about third-party
harm in Hobby Lobby, considering the RFRA standard as relevant to abortion
conscience laws may very well reduce the risk of third-party harm as compared to
current law.
B. Setting Limits on Individual Rights: Civil Rights Act andAmericanswith
DisabilitiesAct
In contrast to RFRA's general standard for assessing the validity of
accommodation laws, other federal laws include direct limitations on individuals'
rights to accommodation and their protection from adverse action by employers. In
particular, both the Civil Rights Act's protections against religious discrimination
and the Americans with Disabilities Act's protections against disability
discrimination set boundaries on what steps employers and others must take to
accommodate individual needs. These statutory limits have been used for decades
and are easily translatable to state abortion conscience laws.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Undue Hardship
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of religion. 65 If an employee establishes a prima facie
case for religious discrimination under Title VII, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that it provided a reasonable accommodation to the employee. 66
Alternatively, the employer may defeat a Title VII claim by demonstrating that it was

J. & Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 2399 (Kagan, J. & Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the departments
"committed themselves to minimizing the impact of contraceptive coverage," but the
expanded exemptions yielded "all costs and no benefits").
63. Id. at 2407-08 (Ginsburg, J. & Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court "has
repeatedly assumed that any religious accommodation to the contraceptive-coverage
requirement would preserve women's continued access to seamless, no-cost contraceptive
coverage" but that the expanded religious exemption "imposes significant burdens on women
employees").
64. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor cited substantial precedent in support of their
conclusion that the government's accommodation of religion "may not benefit religious
adherents at the expense of the rights of third parties." Id. at 2408 (Ginsburg, J. & Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985)).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
66. Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Fort
Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014)).
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unable to provide an accommodation "without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." 67 Effectively, Title VII establishes a duty on the part of
employers to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious observances,
practices, and beliefs to the extent they are able to while still maintaining effective
business practices.
By establishing the undue hardship test, Title VII explicitly recognizes that
accommodating an employee's religious exercise may be burdensome to third
parties. It therefore sets limits on how far employee protections extend-if
accommodating the employee causes an undue hardship to the employer's business,
Title VII's protections end. Importantly, the Supreme Court has interpretedthe undue
hardship test quite favorably for employers, holding that Title VII does not require
employers "to bear more than a de minimis cost" in accommodating a religious
employee. 68 According to the Supreme Court, even shifting employee work
schedules to accommodate an employee's refusal to work on Saturdays would
constitute an undue hardship.69 Moreover, in determining the scope of an employer's
accommodation duties, courts interpret "cost" to the employer broadly-they
consider not only economic costs, but also noneconomic costs, safety risks, and legal
risks.70
While the undue hardship test focuses only on the impact an employee's religious
exercise has on their employer, in the case of employers in the health care industry,
this test necessarily considers effects on patient health and safety as well. Numerous
courts have recognized that in service-oriented industries, accommodation of
employees' religious beliefs may increase public health or safety risks.71 In the

67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining "religion" as "all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business").
68. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (emphasis in original)
(rejecting a claim by an employee who requested Saturdays off, holding that accommodating
this request would impose an undue burden because it would require his employer to bear
additional costs to secure a replacement for him on Saturdays).
69. Id. at 76-77; see also Robinson v. Children's Hosp. Bos., No. 14-10263-DJC, 2016
WL 1337255, at *10 (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2016) (finding undue hardship in arranging employee
workflow so that an unvaccinated employee could avoid vulnerable patients); Brener v.
Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding undue hardship in
requiring other employees to trade shifts with an employee unable to work on the Sabbath).
70. "Undue hardship can be both 'economic costs, such as lost business or having to hire
additional employees to accommodate a Sabbath observer,' and 'non-economic costs, such as
compromising the integrity of a seniority system' or loosening a company's dress code....
Undue hardship can also exist if the proposed accommodation would 'either cause or increase
safety risks or the risk of legal liability for the employer. "' Robinson, 2016 WL 1337255, at
*8 (quoting Cloutierv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 134-35 (1st Cir. 2004); EEOC
v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. IP99-1962-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1168156, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
27, 2001)).
71. See, e.g., Horvath, 946 F.3d at 790 (affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant where the plaintiff, a firefighter, refused to be vaccinated, and the defendant's
concern was preventing the spread of communicable disease "to [the plaintiff], co-workers, or
patients with whom he may come into contact as a first responder").
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healthcare industry in particular, courts have held that employers (like hospitals)
whose primary business purpose is the care of patients may not be required to
accommodate employees whose religious beliefs threaten patient well-being and
where such accommodations would be burdensome.7 2 That said, many circuit courts
hold that employers must prove more than a "speculative" or "hypothetical"
hardship, and that the employer's case is stronger when it can show that hardship
actually resulted from an accommodation.
In a recent Massachusetts case, for example, Children's Hospital Boston
terminated an administrative employee who regularly interacted with patients but
refused to be vaccinated.7 4 The hospital's policy required that all employees working
in patient care areas be vaccinated against influenza. Although the policy allowed
exemptions for employees who faced serious health risks by being vaccinated, the
hospital did not offer a religious exemption "because it concluded that additional
exemptions would increase the risk of transmission" of the flu between patients and
providers. 75 The court granted summary judgment for the hospital on the grounds
that there was no way to accommodate the employee's request without increasing
the risk of disease transmission to vulnerable patients.7 6 It likewise rejected as
"unworkable" the plaintiff's proposal that the hospital modify her responsibilities to
allow her "to avoid relatively more vulnerable patients and not others." 7 According
to the court, forcing the hospital to "arrange its work flow around uncertain factors.

72. See, e.g., Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that
accommodating a chaplain whose "philosophy of... care of psychiatric patients is antithetical
to" his employer's would have created an undue hardship, given that the hospital's primary
purpose was furthering the "overall well-being of the patients"); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health
Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing jury finding that hospital violated
Title VII, where accommodating a counselor's request to counsel patients only on topics that
did not violate her religious beliefs would have imposed more than a de minimis cost, given
the size of the employer's staff and "the nature of psychological counseling incorporating trust
relationships developed overtime"); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th
Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment in favor of hospital, finding that accommodating an Orthodox
Jewish pharmacist who was not able to work on the Sabbath would have caused an undue
burden at a hospital with only five pharmacists, increasing workload on other pharmacists and
"result[ing] in a decline in the quality of patient care"); Head v. Adams Farm Living, Inc., 775
S.E.2d 904, 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (applying the Title VII standard to a state law claim of
religious discrimination, holding that nursing home employee's refusal to be vaccinated was
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal where residents of the nursing home were
medically vulnerable). But cf Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing judgment in favor of employer, holding that attempts to
accommodate a nurse's religious opposition to abortion would not have caused undue hardship
because the majority of her duties did not involve gynecological procedures and the employer
made no showing that scheduling changes would have been burdensome).
73. See Hellingerv. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365-66 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing
many circuit court cases).
74. Robinson, 2016 WL 1337255.
75. Id. at *2
76. Id. at *9-10.
77. Id. at* 10.
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.. would have been an undue hardship because it would have imposed more than
a de minimis cost."78
In a case addressing a Title VII claim in the context of conscientious objection to
abortion, the Third Circuit likewise acknowledged that patient interests are relevant
to an employer's decision of whether and how to accommodate a refusing employee.
In Shelton v. University ofMedicine and Dentistry, a public hospital prevailed on a
Title VII claim by a labor and delivery nurse who opposed abortion for religious
reasons and was subsequently dismissed. 79 Several times, the nurse objected to
providing emergency care to pregnant patients with life-threatening issues where
treatment required terminating the pregnancies. 80 The hospital, believing that her
refusals threatened patient safety, attempted to accommodate her by proposing a
transfer to the neonatal intensive care unit and offering her the opportunity to apply
for a different position. 81 When she refused both accommodations, she was
dismissed.8 2 Finding that the hospital had satisfied its duty to offer reasonable
accommodations, the Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the hospital.8 3 Although the court did not rule on the question of undue hardship,
it emphasized the connection between employee refusals and patient safety,
describing health care providers as "public protectors."84 According to the court,
"public trust and confidence requires that a public hospital's health care
practitioners-with professional ethical obligations to care for the sick and injuredwill provide treatment in time of emergency."85
In contrast to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, most state's abortion conscience
laws do not balance conscience protections against an employer's legitimate business
interests. Only three states impose a similar "undue hardship" test in their abortion
refusal laws. 86 Thus, most state conscience laws require employers to accommodate
employees' conscientious refusal to perform abortions regardless of the burden these
accommodations impose on employers or the populations they serve. As a result,
while a hospital that dismisses a refusing employee after the employee rejects a
reasonable accommodation might be free from liability under Title VII, the hospital
would not be able to defeat a claim under the state's abortion conscience law. The
employer would be barred by state law from disciplining the employee or taking any
adverse employment action. Moreover, in most states, any patients who might be
injured as a result of the provider's refusal would be barred from bringing suit.87
Interestingly, some courts have interpreted state conscience statutes and
antidiscrimination laws to incorporate Title VII's undue hardship standard-even
where the statutory text establishes no explicit limitations on refusing providers'

78. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 134).
79. 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
80. Id. at 222-23.
81. Id. at 223.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 226-28.

84. Id. at 228.
85. Id.
86.

See supra note 10.

87. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1261-62.
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rights. 88 To cite one example, the Florida conscience law at issue in Kenny v.
Ambulatory Center of Miami, Florida., Inc. protected employees who refused to
participate in abortions from "any disciplinary or other recriminatory action," with
no explicit limitations on those protections. 89 In a challenge by a nurse who was
demoted from her position as a result of her refusal to participate in abortions, 90 the
court considered whether to "apply the federal standard requiring reasonable
accommodation unless undue hardship exists, or to apply the more stringent standard
of disallowing discrimination regardless of the cost."91 It concluded, without
explaining its reasoning, that the state statute should be interpreted to incorporate the
federal standard. 9 2
Other courts, however, have rejected the notion that state laws prohibiting
religious discrimination should be read to include Title VII-like requirements that
are not in the statutory text. 93 In Olin Corp. v. Fair Employment Practice
Commission, for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the Illinois Fair

88. See, e.g., Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., 286 N.W.2d 847, 853 (Wis. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that despite the absence of statutory text to this effect, the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act "requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to their
employees' religious practices," but declining to decide whether Title VII's undue hardship
test should be read into the reasonable accommodation requirement); Wondzell v. Alaska
Wood Prods., Inc., 583 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1978), rev'd on othergrounds, 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska
1979) (holding that a duty of reasonable accommodation should be read into an Alaska statute
forbidding religious discrimination by employers and labor unions); Rankins v. Comm'n on
Prof'l Competence of Ducor, 593 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a duty to provide
reasonable accommodation is implied by California's constitutional prohibition of religious
disqualification from employment); Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, United
Paperworks Int'l Union, 383 A.2d 369 (Me. 1978) (holding that employment discrimination
provisions of Maine's Human Rights Act were intended to be the state counterparts of the
Civil Rights Act and that federal statutory requirements should be considered when
interpreting the state law); see also Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d
1262, 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing supporting cases); Hiatt v. Walker Chevrolet Co.,
837 P.2d 618, 622 (Wash. 1992) (citing supporting cases); Am. Motors Corp., 286 N.W.2d at
852 (citing supporting cases).
89. 400 So. 2d at 1264 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 458.22(5) (repealed 1979)).
90. The court ultimately held that because the nurse was able to assist in "approximately
eighty-four percent" of procedures, accommodating her would not have caused undue
hardship, and the employee was entitled to damages and reinstatement of her position. Id at
1266.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Gen. Motors Corp., 287 N.W.2d 240 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act's antidiscrimination
provision did not impose a duty on employers to make reasonable accommodation to religious
needs of employees, and that there was no legislative intent to impose such a requirement);
Hiatt, 837 P.2d at 622 (declining to decide whether a Washington antidiscrimination law
should be read to incorporate Title VII's reasonable accommodation standard but "specifically
disapprov[ing] that portion of the Court of Appeals decision in this case which assumes that
our state statute against discrimination based on creed is identical to the federal law"); see also
Hiatt, 837 P.2d at 622 (citing supporting cases); Am. Motors Corp., 286 N.W.2d at 952 (citing
supporting cases).

2021]

UNILATERAL BURDENS AND THIRD-PARTY HARMS

1239

Employment Practices Act (IFEPA) could not be construed as imposing on
employers an affirmative duty to accommodate religious beliefs. 94 The Fair
Employment Practices Commission had found that an employer unlawfully
discriminated against an employee in violation of the IFEPA because it did not make
a good faith effort to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs. 95 Both the
circuit court and appellate courts, however, held that the IFEPA does not impose a
duty to provide accommodations, and that the Commission's imposition of this
obligation exceeded its authority. 96
More recently, a North Carolina appellate court in Head v. Adams Farm Living,
Inc., similarly rejected a plaintiff's argument that Title VII's duty of reasonable
accommodation should be read into a North Carolina antidiscrimination law. 97 In that
case, the plaintiff was an employee working at a nursing facility who regularly came
into contact with medically vulnerable patients, but who refused a flu vaccine
required by the facility and recommended by the county health department. 98
Given that courts are divided on the issue of whether state antidiscrimination laws
should be read to implicitly incorporate Title VII's requirements, legislatures
wishing to balance employee and employer protections in health care conscience
laws would be advised to explicitly incorporate the undue hardship standard into their
statutory language. Making such a change would mean that if an employer
demonstrated that accommodating an employee's conscientious objection to
abortion would cause undue hardship on the employer-whether because it would
require imposing burdens on other employees, or because it would impose risks on
patients-the employee would lose his protection against adverse employment
action. The employer, then, could require that the employee switch to another shift,
move to a different unit, or could even terminate their contract.
By taking one of these actions, an employer would be able to protect patient safety
by ensuring that a patient would not be refused care by the provider serving them.
However, this does not eliminate the third-party risk entirely. Typically, an employer
will take action only after it becomes aware that an employee's objection has had an
adverse impact on patients. In Shelton, for example, the hospital terminated a nurse
only after she refused to provide emergency care to pregnant patients with lifethreatening issues several times. 99 Granting employers a statutory right to take
adverse action against refusing employees would not protect patients who have

94. 341 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). This case was later affirmed by Illinois Supreme
Court. However, the Illinois Supreme Court did not reach a conclusion on whether the federal
standard should apply, because "even if it is assumed . . that the Fair Employment Practices
Act requires an employer to reasonably accommodate to the religious needs of employees
where it can be done without undue hardship on the employer's business . . Olin proved that
undue hardship rendered the requested accommodations unreasonable." Olin Corp. v. Fair
Emp. Pracs. Comm'n, 367 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (Ill. 1977).
95. Olin Corp., 341 N.E.2d at 460.
96. Id. at 460-61, 468 (concluding that "the Commission injected something new and
entirely different from discrimination as contemplated by the drafters of the statute").
97. 775 S.E.2d 904, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (citingN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (Supp.
2020)).
98. Id. at 906-08.
99. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
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already been impacted by such refusals. Likewise, it would not speak to the ability
of state licensing boards and other government actors to discipline health care
providers whose refusals negatively impact patients.
Defenders of absolute conscience protection might argue that there are good
reasons why most state conscience laws do not set Title VII-type limits on the
protections established for individual providers. One potentially relevant difference
may be that Title VII's protections are much broader than those established by
abortion conscience laws. Title VII does not limit the types of religious observances
it protects, while abortion conscience laws only protect refusals to participate in
abortion. Moreover, Title VII applies in all employment contexts, whereas abortion
conscience laws typically impact only health care institutions like hospitals. It is
possible that state legislatures, when passing abortion conscience laws, may have
concluded that hospitals and other health care institutions are not likely to experience
hardship in this very limited context. However, the conclusions of many courts in
health care-related Title VII cases belie this claim.
At the very least, the question
of whether health care facilities are likely to be burdened by accommodating abortion
refusers is one that should be decided by courts rather than legislators.
One significant limitation to incorporating Title VII's undue hardship standard
into state conscience laws is that Title VII applies only to the context of individual
refusals, and not institutional refusals. As a result, this change may reduce the risk of
harm to patients only slightly. Institutional refusals-for example, by the significant
number of Catholic hospitals in the United States-are more common than refusals
by individual health care providers, and therefore impact a larger number of
patients. 1 Even if an undue hardship standard were introduced into state abortion
conscience laws, if a Catholic hospital prohibited its employees from performing
abortion as a matter of institutional policy, the burdens of that prohibition would still
fall on patients.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act: Limiting Direct Threats
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects employees with disabilities
from employment discrimination and establishes their right to reasonable
accommodation in the workplace. 1 2 Like Title VII (and in contrast to most health

100. See cases cited supra note 72. See also Harrington, supra note 22, at 782, 789 (noting
that absolute conscience accommodations "may threaten the health and safety of patients [and]
cause significant hardship on the employer[]" and "there is little recognition of the burden that
an untimely conscientious refusal may have on the employer or the health care worker's
colleagues"); Rene F. Najera & Dorit R. Reiss, First Do No Harm: Protecting Patients
Through Immunizing Health Care Workers, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 363 (2016) (noting that in the
context of flu vaccines, accommodations based on reassignments would be burdensome to
hospitals); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & V.B Dubal, Influenza Mandates and Religious
Accommodation: Avoiding Legal Pitfalls, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 756, 758 (2018) (arguing
that in the context of influenza vaccination requirement, the burden on a hospital and its
patients to accommodate an employee's choice to remain unvaccinated "likely constitutes an
undue hardship").
101.

See generally Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1288.

102. 42 U.S.C. § 12111-17.
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care conscience laws) the ADA recognizes that there are limits on the burdens that
third parties should be asked to bear when accommodating an employee's needs-in
this case, needs based on disability rather than religious belief.103
Just as under Title VII, an employer is not required under the ADA to provide
employees with accommodations that would "impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business." 0 4 However, proving undue hardship demands more of
employers under the ADA than under Title VII. To prove that a proposed
accommodation imposes an undue hardship for the purposes of the ADA, an
employer must demonstrate that the accommodation "requir[es] significant difficulty
or expense" in light of a variety of enumerated factors.10 5 As with Title VII, courts
consider not only financial costs but also whether an accommodation would be
"extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or . . would fundamentally alter the nature or

operation of the business."106
Unlike Title VII, however, the ADA explicitly privileges employers in situations
where an employee poses a "direct threat to the health or safety of other[s]."1 0 7 To
receive protection under the ADA, a person with a disability must be able to perform
essential job functions, either with or without accommodation. 108 However, a person
who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others is not a "qualified
individual" entitled to ADA protection. 109 Regulations define a "direct threat" as a
"substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation,"110 determined by an

103. As such, the ADA differs significantly from the other laws discussed in this Article,
all of which focus on religious and conscientious beliefs rather than personal needs based on
disability. There are obviously very meaningful differences between the two contexts, and I
recognize that some might challenge this analogy. That said, I believe that given the ADA's
widespread recognition and political support, and the fact that it seeks to protect individual
rights much in the same way as the Civil Rights Act, it provides helpful guidance for these
purposes.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2020).
106. Employer's Defense Under Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof
Facts § 20 (1997).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The ADA also provides a specific exception for food handlers
with infectious or communicable diseases. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(e).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) ("The term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace."); see also Rizzo v. Child.'s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 211
(5th Cir. 2000) (establishing that "[a]n employee who is a direct threat is not a qualified
individual with a disability"); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a person is not "otherwise qualified" for employment if he poses a
significant risk to the health or safety of others and that risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987))).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2020). "In determining whether an individual would pose a
direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature
and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm." Id.
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individualized assessment based on "reasonable medical judgment." 111 Thus, the
ADA balances an employee's need for accommodation against not only the business
needs of the employer but also the needs of customers, employees, and others who
might be subject to harm. More importantly, it explicitly prioritizes public health and
safety as factors to be considered in determining the scope of an employee's
individual rights.11 2 As a result, when hospital employees whose essential job
functions relate to patient health and safety bring ADA claims, they are rarely
successful. 113
While commentators acknowledge that there is a sound policy basis for the direct
threat exemption, many have criticized the way that this standard has been
interpreted." 4 During the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s, scholars (and
some courts) challenged the degree to which defendant-employers relied on their
own subjective assessments of what constitutes a direct threat, rather than medical
evidence regarding the means and likelihood of HIV transmission." 5 More recently,
similar concerns have arisen about employers' treatment of employees with
psychiatric disorders 16 and substance abuse problems." In these contexts,

111. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; see also Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260,
1268-69 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that an employer's determination of whether an employee
poses a direct threat must be "objectively reasonable" (citing Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113,
1122-23 (10th Cir. 2007))); EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir.
2015) (holding that employer could avoid liability "if it had reasonably believed the job would
entail a direct threat" and that proving "actual threat" was unnecessary).
112. Individual Poses Direct Threat to Health or Safety of Others, 2 AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: PRACT. & COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:208 ("The ADA's direct threat provision

stems from the recognition of the importance of prohibiting discrimination against individuals
with disabilities while protecting others from significant health and safety risks .... "); see
also EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding congressional intent that
risks to others should be considered in both the "direct threat" analysis and in the analysis of
whether an employee is qualified for a position); cf Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 293 n5 (1987) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act's "direct threat" exclusion
"evinces congressional intent to avoid the Act's interference with public health and safety
concerns").
113. LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA ROTHSTEIN, Health Care Professionalswith Disabilities,
in DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 10:7 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that "courts have given a high
degree of deference to health care institutions . . [based on] legitimate concerns about health
and safety in receiving medical treatment," and "[b]ecause of this deference, individuals
with disabilities have succeeded in very few of these cases").
114.

See, e.g., Ann Hubbard, Understandingand Implementing the ADA 's Direct Threat

Defense, 95 Nw. U.L. REv. 1279 (2001) (arguing that that the direct threat provision requires
a scientific approach to risk assessment and criticizing employers and judges who rely on
rely on perceived rather than actual risk).
115. See, e.g., Katrina Atkins & Richard Bales, H[Vandthe Direct ThreatDefense, 91 KY.
L.J. 859 (2002); Hubbard, supranote 114.
116.

See, e.g., Randal . Goldstein, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United

Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 928 (2001); Stacy A. Hickox & Angela Hall, Atypical
Accommodationsfor Employees with PsychiatricDisabilities, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 537 (2018).
117.

See, e.g., Judith J. Johnson, Rescue the Americans with Disabilities Act from

Restrictive Interpretations:Alcoholism as an Illustration, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 169 (2007);
Jodi Nelson Meyer, Chemically Dependent Employees and the ADA in the Medical
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commentators argue that some employers have impermissibly taken adverse action
on the basis of insufficient evidence that the employee's conduct would actually
threaten public health or safety. 18
While employers may in some cases be overzealous in identifying risks associated
with employee disabilities, that does not negate the fact that the Congress, in passing
the ADA, explicitly recognized the importance of protecting third parties from harms
that might result from accommodation of individual rights.
Incorporating a direct threat test into health care conscience laws would explicitly
acknowledge the harms that conscience-based refusals can impose upon patients.
Beyond relying on the undue hardship test that focuses primarily on burdens to
employers, the direct threat standard would more directly address patient needs. Just
as in ADA cases, however, the assessment of what constitutes a "direct threat" would
have to be done on a case-by-case basis; it is likely that judicial review would be
required in some cases to ensure that employers are not being overly zealous in
identifying threats that would justify limiting an employee's right to accommodation.
ADA case law offers helpful guidance as to how this standard might be applied if
it were incorporated into health care conscience laws. Consider EEOC v. Amego,
Inc., a First Circuit case involving an employee at a group home for people with
severe cognitive disabilities. 119 The employee had psychiatric issues and had
attempted suicide by overdose twice, and concerns had arisen about missing and
improperly dispensed client medication. According to the employer, terminating the
employee was justified because handling prescription medication was one of their
essential job functions. The court agreed, concluding that where an employee's job
functions involve the safety of others, the employee is only entitled to
accommodation if she demonstrates that she can perform those duties without
endangering others. 120
In a way, the ADA's direct threat standard can be analogized to the emergency
exception that some states have in their abortion conscience laws.1 2 1 Both limit a
provider's right to accommodation in situations where the health and safety of third

Profession: Does Patient Safety Exempt Hospital Employers from Compliance Under the
Direct Threat and/or the Business Necessity Exceptions?, 80 N.D. L. REV. 241 (2004).

118. See, e.g., Hickox et al., supra note 116 (arguing that employers commonly deny
accommodations based on their own assumptions about what constitutes a direct threat, and
that these assumptions can be influenced by stereotypes).
119. 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's finding that an employee's
depression rendered her unqualified to perform the essential job function of administering
medications to severely disabled individuals but finding that discharging the employee based
on her suicide attempts by overdose did not qualify as a discharge on the basis of her
depression); see also Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998)
(upholding ruling in favor of employer regarding an employee neurologist with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder and short-term memory problems whose condition had caused
mistakes in patients' care and who had "voiced his own concerns about his ability to take care
of patients, stating that it was only a matter of time before he seriously hurt someone").
120. Amego, 110 F.3d at 135.
121. See Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1280 (identifying thirteen states that limit the right to
refuse participation in abortion where a patient requires emergency treatment); see also
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (requiring
examination and treatment of patients with emergency medical conditions).
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parties is directly threatened. State emergency exceptions are narrower, however, as
they typically limit rights of conscientious refusal only in cases where the patient's
life is at risk. 12 2 A direct threat standard, in contrast, could potentially be interpreted
more broadly to protect against general threats to health and safety even if they do
not rise to the level of life-threatening emergency. For example, one situation in
which applying a direct threat standard (as opposed to an emergency standard) would
reduce risks of patient harm is in the context of nonemergent but medically necessary
abortions. 123 Women who are advised to terminate their pregnancies for medical
reasons-for example, due to preeclampsia or cardiovascular disease-are at great
risk if they are denied treatment. 124 A patient who is refused abortion under these
circumstances is not likely to require immediate medical attention to prevent
imminent harm,12 5 but hospitals or courts could reasonably interpret a provider's
refusal as directly threatening the patient's health and safety. In contrast, providers
would still be protected in cases of patients seeking purely elective abortions.
Another benefit of a direct threat limitation is that it could potentially be applied
to institutional refusal as well as individual refusals. Because many conscience laws
establish that hospitals have no duty to admit patients for abortions or to perform
abortions, adding a direct threat limitation would ensure that patients seeking care at
religiously affiliated hospitals do not face significant threats to their health or safety.
In addition to protecting patients in need of emergency care, a direct threat limitation
might protect patients subject to institutional refusal policies in other contexts-for
example, in the context of tubal ligation during Cesarean section. 126 While there are
certainly challenges in applying the direct threat limitation to institutional refusals,
as described in Section IV below, it is worth considering as a meaningful tool for
balancing individual rights against third-party harms.

122.

See Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1280-81 & n.105.

123. Id. at 1298, 1303.
124. Id. (identifying high-risk health conditions where abortion is considered the standard
of care and noting that because EMTALA only protects patients suffering from "acute
symptoms of sufficient severity" that are likely to result in serious bodily harm if not
immediately stabilized, it does not extend to all medically necessary abortions).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (defining emergency medical condition as
"a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including
severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in (i) placing the health of the individual . .. in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part").
126. Because sterilization is prohibited in Catholic-affiliated hospitals, physicians cannot
perform tubal ligations on women who are undergoing planned Cesarean delivery and do not
want to have more children. In non-Catholic hospitals, this combination of procedures is
common, as it eliminates the need for a second surgery on a later date at a different facility.
Surgery poses major medical risks, and the reason tubal ligations are typically performed
concurrently with Cesarean sections is to reduce the risks associated with a second surgical
intervention. See generally Debra B. Stulberg, Yael Hoffman, Irma Hasham Dahlquist & Lori
R. Freedman, Tubal Ligation in Catholic Hospitals: A Qualitative Study of OB/GYNs'
Experiences, 90 CONTRACEPTION 422 (2014).
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C. Imposing Strict Conditions on Individual Rights:
State Health CareDecision-makingActs

.

While there has been no uniform empirical survey of state health care conscience
laws outside the reproductive health context, enough research has been done to
collect general observations about the protections these laws offer to both providers
and patients. This Section focuses on conscientious refusal provisions in state laws
relating to advance care planning, health care decision-making, and end-of-life
care. 1 2 7
According to one of the leading academic experts in the area of end-of-life care
and patient decision-making, almost every state health care decision-making act
(HCDA) allows health care providers in these contexts to refuse to comply with a
patient or surrogate's treatment request for reasons of conscience. 128 These types of
conflicts often arise when a patient or surrogate requests intensive life-sustaining
treatment that a health care provider believes is ethically inappropriate (typically, on
the grounds that it is medically ineffective and/or harmful to the patient), sometimes
referred to as "futile" care. 129 For example, some physicians oppose performing CPR
on frail patients who are already in the process of dying, on the grounds that
performing chest compressions risks pain and injury with no corresponding
benefit.130 When a patient's family demands such aggressive treatment, health care
providers may experience serious moral distress.131
Notably, conscientious refusal rights in state HDCAs are "[t]ypically . .
conditional, such that a patient's right outweighs a provider's conscience protection
unless or until a patient can be transferred." 13 2 Because of these significant
limitations, Pope writes, "there is effectively no right to refuse treatment" prior to

127. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and

Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163 (2010) (identifying state and federal refusal
rights in end-of-life care contexts).
128. Id. at 169-71.
129. See generally Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., American Thoracic Society, An Official
ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy Statement: Responding to Requests for Potentially
Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE
MED. 1318 (2015).
130. Zoe Fritz & Jonathan Fuld, Ethical Issues Surrounding Do Not Attempt Resuscitation
Orders: Decisions, Discussions, and Deleterious Effects, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 593 (2010); Ellen
M. Robinson, An EthicalAnalysis of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation for Eldersin Acute Care,
13 AACN ADVANCED CRITICAL CARE 132 (2002).

131. Robinson, supra note 130 (finding that "healthcare providers who perform CPR on
elderly patients often find themselves in morally distressing circumstances"); Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor To Unilaterally Refuse LifeSustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 56-57 n.319 (2007) (noting that "futility cases are

driven by providers' desire to avoid patient suffering").
132. Pope, supra note 127, at 170; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1)
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145C.11(c) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-12(3) (2020) (all conditioning refusing
providers' immunity from civil liability or disciplinary action on their compliance with
statutory requirements regarding patient notification and patient transfer).
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patient transfer.13 3 Until the patient is transferred, providers are obligated to continue
treating the patient in accordance with the patient or surrogate's request, even if the
provider is conscientiously opposed to that treatment.134 Even Texas, which is
viewed as having one of the most provider-friendly laws because it permits unilateral
decisions to discontinue life-sustaining treatment, imposes a ten-day treat-untiltransfer requirement.13
That said, not every HCDA-protected conscientious refusal occurs in the context
of patient-requested treatment. An HCDA case that is more similar to abortion
refusal would be one where a provider refuses to comply with a patient's decision or
directive to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. 136 This refusal would also be
subject to the state HCDA, including the requirements to provide notice to the patient
and facilitate their transfer to another provider who is willing to comply with the
patient's decision. As in the case of abortion refusal, the harm resulting from a refusal
to discontinue life-sustaining treatment is a delay in access. Such a delay continues
the patient's unwanted suffering, but in most circumstances the patient will
eventually find a provider willing to withdraw treatment in accordance with their
request. Although courts have historically been reluctant to recognize this harm (a
cause of action for "wrongful living") as legally compensable, many modern courts
have recognized that a delay in withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is a violation
of patient autonomy that may justify a civil or administrative remedy.13 7

133.

Pope, supra note 127, at 170.

134. Pope, supra note 131, at 59; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.1105(2) (West 2016)
(establishing that a "health care provider or facility that is unwilling to carry out the wishes of
the patient or the treatment decision of his or her surrogate or proxy because of moral or ethical
beliefs must within 7 days either: (a) Transfer the patient to another health care provider or
facility ... or (b) If the patient has not been transferred, carry out the wishes of the patient or
the patient's surrogate or proxy"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09 (2020) (requiring that a
health care provider who declines to comply with a health care decision for reasons of
conscience must "take all reasonable steps to transfer care of the principal to another health
care provider who is willing to honor the agent's health care decision . .. and shall provide
continuing care to the principal until a transfer can be effected"). Moreover, when these issues
reach courts, courts typically side with patients over providers, "requir[ing] objecting
physicians and institutions to continue to provide care to which they object based on their
professional ethical concerns because the patient's surrogate requested that care be continued."
Martha Swartz, Health Care Providers' Rights To Refuse To Provide Treatment on the Basis
ofMoral or Religious Beliefs, 19 HEALTH LAW. 25, 27 (2006).
135. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2017) (establishing procedures

to follow when a physician refuses to honor a treatment decision made by or on behalf of the
patient).

136. See Stephen Wear, Susan Lagaipa & Gerald Logue, Toleration of Moral Diversity
and the Conscientious Refusal by Physicians To Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 J.

MED. & PHIL. 147 (1994); Duarte v. Chino Cmty. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that statutory immunity provisions in a state HCDA protected hospital from
liability where a patient's attending physician failed to comply with a request to either
withdraw life-sustaining treatment or transfer the patient to a health care provider who would
comply).
137.

Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment

Without Consent: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L.
213 (2013) (identifying factors that cause physicians to breach their duty to respect patients'
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Compared to abortion conscience laws, state HCDAs place a far greater emphasis
on protecting patients from harm. While HCDAs often impose "treat-until-transfer"
requirements described above, not a single state abortion conscience law imposes
similar requirements. HCDAs also frequently impose duties to refer patients for
services to other providers.138 In contrast, only two states with abortion conscience
laws impose referral requirements. 139 While many HCDAs require providers to
notify their patients of their refusal,140 only eight states with abortion conscience laws
have a notification requirement."'
There is certainly criticism to be made of HCDA provisions that require providers
to engage in conduct they believe to be immoral (or complicit in immoral behavior),
such as treat-until-transfer requirements and referral requirements. In effect, while
these laws establish a "right" of conscientious refusal, that "right" is negated by
requirements that providers act against their consciences. That said, in some end-oflife contexts, these requirements may be more justifiable than in the context of
abortion refusal. In the traditional case of a futility conflict where a provider opposes
aggressive treatment requested by the patient or their family, protecting the right of
conscientious refusal will often result in the patient's deterioration or even death. In
balancing the rights of providers against those of patients, imposing a treatment duty
in this context is necessary to prevent what the patient or surrogate deems to be an
irreparable harm. In contrast, in the abortion context, allowing a physician to refuse
a patient-requested abortion would risk immediate injury or death only in cases of
emergency; for other abortions (whether elective or nonemergent but medically
necessary), the harm is a lesser risk, one of delay in accessing treatment. 12 Thus, for
legislators who aim to prevent harms to third parties resulting from provider refusals,
imposing treatment and/or referral duties in the end-of-life context could be viewed
as more justifiable than in the abortion context-even if the strength of the providers'
conscientious conviction is the same.

right to refuse and demonstrating that health care providers have increasingly been subject to
sanctions for such refusals); Nadia N. Sawicki, A New Life for Wrongful Living, 58 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 279 (2013) (discussing history of the wrongful living cause of action and
identifying cases suggesting the increased viability of such claims).
138. Pope, supra note 127, at 171 (noting that most "conscientious objection rights" in the
context of end-of-life health care "require the objecting provider to at least inform the patient
about the objectionable treatment and arrange a transfer or referral").
139.

Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1282.

140. Pope, supranote 131, at 58-59 (noting that under the Uniform Health Care Decisions
Act, a provider who plans to decline to comply with a health care decision "must first inform
the patient or surrogate"); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2020); CAL. PROB. CODE §
4734(b) (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(e) (West 2017); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5807(E) (repealed 2019); Miss. CODE ANN. §41-41-215(5) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
24-7A-7(E) (West Supp. 2020) (all conditioning provider refusal rights on "timely
communicat[ion]" of the refusal to the patient or patient's agent).
141.

Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1281.

142. That is not to say that the risk of delayed access to abortion is harmless. As states pass
legislation limiting the availability of abortion after a specified number of weeks of gestation,
there is an increased risk that delays in access will lead to a patient's inability to secure a legal
abortion.
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D. WithdrawingProtectionsfor IndividualRights: State Immunization Laws
Every U.S. state requires that students entering elementary and high school be
vaccinated against a variety of communicable diseases.14 3 Parents can secure medical
exemptions for children with medical contraindications to vaccination,14 4 and most
state laws establish exemptions for those with religious or philosophical
objections.14 5 However, support for religious and philosophical exemptions began to
change in 2015, when the California legislature amended its school vaccination law
to eliminate "personal belief' exemptions. 14 6 This change in law was prompted by
serious measles outbreaks in the state, which led the legislature to conclude that the
public health risks of religious exemptions to vaccination outweighed their
benefits. 147 While there was some public opposition and several legal challenges,14 8
the severity of the public health crisis resulted in widespread political support for
elimination of the personal belief exemption.1 49
After similar outbreaks across the United States, several other states also
withdrew parents' right to exempt their children from vaccination for reasons of
religion or personal belief.150 As a result, vaccination rates in these states increased,

143.

Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, LitigatingAlternative Facts: School Vaccine Mandates in the

Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 212 (2018). Typically, required vaccinations include:
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR); diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTaP); varicella
(chicken pox); and polio, among others. Id. In most states, vaccinations are required not only
for public school students but also for children who attend private schools, as well as those
who participate in childcare services like day care. James G. Hodge and Lawrence O. Gostin,
School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L. J.
831, 833, 868 (2001).

144. See id.
145. Until 2015, only two states (Mississippi and West Virginia) did not have religious
exemptions. James Colgrove & Abigail Lowin, A Tale of Two States: Mississippi, West
Virginia, and Exemptions to Compulsory School Vaccination Laws, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 348,
348 (2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1172 [https://perma
.cc/SQ8C-AWFG]. As of 2019, seventeen states also had exemptions for personal
philosophical beliefs. Patti Neighmond, StatesMove To RestrictParents'Refusal to Vaccinate
TheirKids, NHPR (Mar. 2, 2019, 12:03 AM), https://www.nhpr.org/post/states-move-restrictparents-refusal-vaccinate-their-kids#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5L47-C277].
146. S. 277, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). The only vaccination exemptions permitted
after these nonmedical exemptions were withdrawn were for (1) medical reasons, (2) home
schooling, or (3) individualized education programs (IEPs) under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
147. See Reiss, supra note 143, at 215-18.
148. Id. at 219-21.
149. Id. at 217-18.
150. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2164(9) (McKinney 2012), repealedby Act of June 13, 2019,
ch. 35, § 1, 2019 N.Y. Sess. Laws A2371-A (2019) (repealing a provision stating the
immunization requirements "shall not apply to children whose parent, parents, or guardian
hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practices herein required");
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Title 20-A, § 6355(3) (2008), repealedby Act to Protect Maine Children
and Students from Preventable Diseases by Repealing Certain Exemptions from the Laws
Governing Immunization Requirements, ch. 154, § 2, 2019 ME. L. 386, 386 (repealing the
provision of the law allowing parents to assert a "sincere religious belief' opposing
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decreasing the risk of outbreaks." Importantly, there is no constitutional barrier to
these changes; numerous courts have affirmed that religious and philosophical
exemptions to vaccination are not constitutionally required. 112

vaccination); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.210.090 (West Supp. 2021) (effective July 1,
2022) ("A philosophical or personal objection may not be used to exempt a child from the
measles mumps, and rubella vaccine."). Similar bills have been proposed in several other
states. Jennifer Nessel, Religious Vaccine Exemption Bills Spark Debate Across the United
States, PHARMACY TIMEs (Feb. 25, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news

/religious-vaccine-exemption-bills-spark-debate-across-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc
/H97M-JR8Y].
151. See Sindiso Nyathi, Hannah C. Karpel, Kristin L. Sainani, Yvonne Maldonado, Peter
J. Hotez, Eran Bendavid & Nathan C. Lo, The 2016 California Policy To Eliminate
Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Changes in Vaccine Coverage: An Empirical Policy

Analysis, PLOS MED. (Dec. 23, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10
.1371/journal.pmed.1002994#abstracto
[https://perma.cc/R44W-E29Q]
(finding
that
California's elimination of nonmedical exemptions was associated with an estimated increase
in vaccination coverage and a reduction in nonmedical exemptions); Emily Oster & Geoffrey
Kocks, After Debacle, How California Became a Role Model on Measles, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/upshot/measles-vaccination-californiastudents.html [https://perma.cc/7RCU-T5U8] (finding higher vaccination rates and lower risks
of disease outbreaks in California after exemptions were withdrawn); see also Robert A.
Bednarczyk, Adrian R. King, Ariana Lahijani & Saad B. Omer, Current Landscape of
Nonmedical Vaccination Exemptions in the United States: Impact of Policy Changes, 18
EXPERT REV. VACCINES 175 (2019) (finding that rates of nonmedical exemptions are higher in

states where such exemptions are easier to obtain); W. David Bradford & Anne Mandich,
Some State Vaccination Laws Contribute to Greater Exemption Rates and Disease Outbreaks
in the United States, 34 HEALTH AFFS. 1383, 1387-89 (2015) (finding that state-level

vaccination exemption laws affect immunization rates and the incidence of preventable
disease). Mississippi, which has had no non-medical exemptions to its vaccination laws since
1983, has historically had the highest rate of kindergarten vaccination in the country. Colgrove
et al., supra note 145.

152. Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (denying motion
for preliminary injunction on the grounds that amendment banning personal belief exemptions
was likely not unconstitutional); Schenker v. County of Tuscarawas, No. 5:12 CV 1020, 2012
WL 4061223, at *11-12 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2012) (dismissing free exercise claim
challenging vaccination requirement where state took custody of neglected children and
sought to vaccinate them); Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542-44 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding that a state statute permitting exclusion of unvaccinated students from public school
based on religious exemption did not violate plaintiff parents' constitutional rights); Workman
v. Mingo Cnty. Schs., 419 F. App'x 348, 352-56 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements); Brown v.
Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Miss. 1979) (holding that non-medical exemptions to
vaccination laws violate citizens' right to equal protection from public health hazards). These
cases typically rely on the test set forth in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905),
which upheld Massachusetts's compulsory smallpox vaccination law against a constitutional
challenge. In Jacobson, the court held that the state's police powers establish its authority to
enact reasonable public health laws, including vaccination requirements, as long as those laws
are not applied in an "arbitrary [or] unreasonable manner." Id. at 25-28. That said, some
scholars have expressed skepticism that the current Supreme Court, if faced with a Jacobsontype challenge, would apply the same test. See, e.g., Kellen Russoniello, The End of Jacobson's
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How might we analogize states' recent responses in the school vaccination
context to the context of reproductive health conscience laws? In the vaccination
context, as a result of public health concerns, states like California have completely
withdrawn previously existing protections for parents with religious objections to
vaccination. In these states, parents who decline to vaccinate their children are not
permitted to send their children to school. 5 3 The equivalent in the abortion context
would be for a state to completely withdraw providers' right to decline to participate
in abortion services. This does not mean that refusing providers would be physically
compelled to perform abortions (just as refusing parents are not physically compelled
to vaccinate their children). That said, withdrawal of protections would mean that
providers would be subject to consequences for their refusals -for example, adverse
employment action, disciplinary action by licensing agencies, or civil liability.
However, when it comes to justifying such a dramatic response as withdrawal of
rights to conscientious refusal, there are significant differences between the two
contexts. The withdrawal of exemptions in the school vaccination context was done
in direct response to a recognized public health crisis. As the COVID-19 pandemic
has made clear, the more serious a public health crisis, the more willing government
actors are to impose severe restrictions on individual liberties. 5 4 In the reproductive
health context, however, the scope of harms resulting from conscientious refusal is
less extensive than the harms that can result from the spread of communicable
diseases. Certainly, patients can and do face severe health consequences as a result
of provider refusals to deliver reproductive health care services, 155 but the number of
people affected is likely much smaller. Thus, states have a much clearer
justification-from both a political perspective and a legal perspective-for the
withdrawal of conscience protections in the vaccination context. In the absence of a
major and imminent public health threat resulting from providers' conscientious
refusal, states would face challenges completely withdrawing conscience protections
in the abortion context.
Moreover, even if there was sufficient political support for the elimination of
refusal rights in the abortion context, denying providers a right to refuse in all
circumstances (as compared, for example, to in emergency situations only) may not
have the expected positive impact on patients' access to reproductive health services.
Eliminating conscience protections is unlikely to significantly increase the
number of physicians and hospitals willing to provide abortion care. Losing these
legal protections does not mean that providers will be compelled to perform abortions
against their will; it only means that they will face adverse consequences (such as
disciplinary action or civil liability) if they refuse. While some providers may find
these consequences significant enough to change their practices, those whose

Spread: Five Arguments Why an Anti-Intoxicant Vaccine Would Be Unconstitutional,43 AM.

J.L. & MED. 57 (2017); Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts: It's Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather's
Public Health Law, 95 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH

581 (2005).

153. See Reiss, supra note 143, at 229-31.
154. David M. Studdert & Mark A. Hall, Disease Control, Civil Liberties, and Mass
Testing - CalibratingRestrictions During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED.

102 (2020).
155. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1295-97.
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conscientious beliefs are deeply held or grounded in religious doctrine are unlikely
to begin performing abortions just because they have lost legal protections.
Even if a significant number of providers were to expand their practices to include
abortion care as a result of the loss-of-conscience protections, it is not clear that this
would benefit patients. A health care provider who feels pressured to participate in a
service that they deem morally objectionable may not be able to provide optimal
patient care. From an interpersonal perspective, the provider's moral distress may be
reflected in their attitude toward patients, which could cause patients dignitary
harm.156 Furthermore, a provider who is persuaded to perform a service that is outside
the scope of their expertise may lack the skills necessary to perform it, putting patient
safety at risk.
In fact, withdrawing rights of conscientious refusal to participate in abortion may
actually reduce patients' access to care at a broader level. 157 As a result of withdrawal
of conscience protections, some religiously affiliated organizations have ceased
providing important social services. For example, after same-sex marriage was
legalized, adoption and foster care agencies affiliated with Catholic charities stopped
offering services because they were not willing to place children with same-sex
couples. 158 In the face of the PPACA contraceptive mandate, Catholic religious
leaders suggested that Catholic hospitals might have no choice but to shut down if
the mandate was enforced. 159 As Robin Fretwell Wilson notes, while these "dire
predictions may turn out to be nothing more than empty threats ... ,policymakers
may well be loathe [sic] to engage in a high-stakes game of chicken." 160
Thus, in the absence of evidence that conscience-driven abortion refusals pose an
emergent and wide-ranging threat to public health and safety -akin to the spread of
communicable disease-the contemporary shift towards eliminating vaccination
exemptions does not serve as an ideal model for abortion conscience laws.

156. See Nejaime et al., supra note 22, at 2576-77 (discussing dignitary harms associated
with conscience-based health care denials); Rebecca Seales, Woman 'Humiliated' by
Walgreens Over Drugs To End Pregnancy, BBC (June 25, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news

/world-us-canada-44591528 [https://perma.cc/6UAN-SCD3].
157. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception,
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L.

REV. 1417, 1445 (2012) (explaining that an "inflexible" stance toward religious exemptions
may "backfire," and citing examples where "religious objectors, when left no choice . . have
... chosen to exit the market rather than violate their religious beliefs").
158. Id. at 1446-47; Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over
Same-SexAdoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475 (2008); Discrimination Against Catholic Adoption
Services, U.S. CONE. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-

liberty/discrimination-against-catholic-adoption-services.cfm
[https://perma.cc/G8WASQFH]; see also Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. (2021) (reversing and remanding
Third Circuit's denial of foster care agency's motion for preliminary injunction against city of
Philadelphia's refusal to contract with the agency as a result of its policies regarding same-sex
couples).
159. See Wilson, supra note 157, at 1448; Francis Cardinal George, TWhat Are You Going
To Give Up This Lent?, CHI. CATH. (Feb. 26, 2012), http://legacy.chicagocatholic.com
/cnwonline/2012/0226/cardinal.aspx [https://perma.cc/4X99-RUED].
160. Wilson, supra note 157, at 1448-49.
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III. APPLYING THE UNDUE HARDSHIP AND DIRECT THREAT STANDARDS TO
ABORTION CONSCIENCE LAWS

As demonstrated above, many federal and state antidiscrimination and religious
protection laws set clear limits on individuals' right to accommodation. In contrast,
the majority of abortion conscience laws provide absolute protections, setting no
explicit limits on the rights of refusing providers. In doing so, these conscience laws
impose unilateral burdens on patients, employers, and the public, requiring them to
accommodate the needs of conscientious refusers regardless of the burdens those
accommodations might pose. Given that health care providers hold a monopoly on
the provision of medical services, and given the health and safety risks that can arise
when patients are denied access to reproductive care, it is difficult to defend abortion
conscience laws that protect providers even in situations where patient safety is at
risk.
Turning to federal antidiscrimination laws, as well as state laws establishing
personal exemptions in health and safety contexts, is instructive for those seeking to
strike a better balance in the abortion context. These laws offer well-established
standards for balancing individual rights against interests in preventing third-party
harms, and there is nothing preventing legislators from introducing similar standards
into abortion conscience laws.
Ideally, abortion conscience laws could be amended in ways that give clear
guidance to health care providers, employers, and patients as to the limits on
providers' conscience rights. Explicit carveouts aimed at preventing third-party
harm-such as limitations on conscientious refusal rights in cases where refusal
would threaten patient health and safety or impose serious hardships on employerswould be relatively easy to implement, as they are regularly used in other contexts. 161
Such an approach would be preferable to metastandards like RFRA's compelling
interest test, which provides guidance to legislators and courts but not to individual
health care providers making on-the-ground decisions. 162 It would also be preferable
to a wholesale legislative withdrawal of conscientious-refusal rights, which might
lead to even greater third-party harms than under the current system.
The most helpful guidance, therefore, may come from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 163 These laws strike a balance between
the needs of individuals seeking accommodation and the state's interest in ensuring
that such accommodations do not unduly burden third parties.
Accordingly, an important first step in striking this balance in the abortion context
would be to limit providers' right to refuse participation on conscience grounds when
the accommodation of those rights would pose an undue hardship to employers-the
Title VII standard. 164 Currently, only three states include such a limitation in their
abortion conscience laws. 165 A significant downside of this standard, however, is that
it focuses most explicitly on preventing harm to employers like hospitals rather than
to the patients and public they serve. As such, this standard may not be the most

161. See supra Section IIB.
162. See supra Section II.A.
163.

See supra Section IIB.

164. See supra Section II.B.1.
165.

See supra note 10.
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direct solution if the primary concern with abortion conscience laws is the impact
they have on patients' health, safety, and access to care. Moreover, while the undue
hardship standard would limit the ability of individual health care providers to refuse
treatment, it would not be effective in limiting the rights of health care institutions
with broad policies against abortion. Given the prevalence of religiously affiliated
health care systems in the United States and the impact their policies have on
patients, 166 adding an undue hardship limitation to abortion conscience laws would
not, on its own, be effective in preventing most third-party harms.
Coupling an undue hardship standard with something akin to a direct threat
limitation (like the ADA's) would likely be a more effective approach.167 Unlike the
undue hardship to the employer standard, the direct threat standard explicitly
acknowledges the impact an accommodation may have on patients and the public.
Limiting rights of conscientious refusal in cases where accommodating the refusal is
likely to pose a direct threat to patient health and safety would prevent harms to
patients in many of the most extreme circumstances-much like the emergency
exceptions that some states currently have in their abortion conscience laws. 168
By clearly indicating that rights of conscientious refusals do not apply in cases of
direct threat, conscience laws would (at the very least) make explicit the emergency
treatment requirements already established by EMTALA. More importantly,
however, states would have the flexibility to craft a direct threat requirement to
extend beyond federal requirements. For example, EMTALA requires Medicarefunded hospitals with emergency departments to screen and stabilize patients with
emergency medical conditions, defined as those manifesting
acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected
to result in (i) placing the health of the individual . .. in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction
of any bodily organ or part."169
A state, in contrast, might choose to define a "direct threat" as a health threat that
does not rise to the level of EMTALA-defined emergency.
Finally, as discussed in Section II.B.2 above, a direct threat limitation could
potentially be used to limit institutional refusals as well as individual refusals.
Incorporating a direct threat standard into abortion conscience laws would, of course,
be more difficult to implement in cases of institutional refusal than individual refusal.
Legislation imposing limits on individual refusals can be interpreted and applied by
employers, who would then be justified in taking adverse action against individuals
whose refusals cannot be accommodated without threatening patient safety. But in
the context of institutional refusals, institutions would effectively have to selfregulate in order to prevent harm to patients. Those hospitals that continue to refuse

166. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1288-90.
167. See supra Section II.B.2.
168. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1280. However, as I have argued elsewhere, limiting rights
of conscientious refusal only in emergency circumstances may be insufficiently protective of
patients. Id. at 1302-04.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2018).
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abortion care even in the face of direct threats would potentially be subject to adverse
action by the state, but this would likely occur only after patients have already been
harmed.
Another challenge, as we see in ADA cases, is that the assessment of what
constitutes a direct threat is very context specific. For example, a Catholic hospital's
refusal to perform abortions may have a very different impact on patients depending
on whether the hospital is one of many hospitals in an urban location or the only
hospital for hundreds of miles in a relatively rural area. There is certainly a risk that
hospitals may interpret a direct threat standard in ways that deviate from what state
legislators intended. 170 But to the extent that hospitals are already under an obligation
to identify and respond to direct threats for the purposes of the ADA, and to
emergencies for the purposes of EMTALA, a similarly crafted standard in abortionconscience laws should not be more difficult to follow. In the rare instances where
hospitals or individual providers fail to comply with this standard or allege that their
policies and practices do not result in direct threats, the final determination could be
left to the judiciary, as is already the case under the ADA.171 In cases where a hospital
consistently violates a state law aimed at protecting patient access in cases when
refusal would pose a direct threat, state attorneys general might even have a role to
play. 172 While introducing a direct threat limitation to abortion-conscience laws
protecting individual and institutional refusal rights would by no means guarantee
patient access, it would be a meaningful shift away from the current system of
unilateral burden-shifting.
IV. A NOTE ON CIVIL LIABILITY

Obviously, those who believe that abortion is absolutely immoral and whose
personal (or institutional) identities are inextricably tied to this belief are unlikely to
change their behavior regardless of the legal standards applicable to conscientious
refusal. This is to be expected. Thus, the final lesson we might introduce from the
federal and state laws considered in this article is one relating to civil liability.
Abortion conscience laws in a majority of U.S. states bar patients from pursuing tort
remedies when they are injured as a result of a provider's conscientious refusal, even
when that refusal deviates from the medical standard of care. 173 Effectively, they

170. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Trinity Health Corp., No. 15-cv-12611,
2016 WL 922950 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2016) (alleging that as a result of hospital policies
under the USCCB Directives, hospitals have "repeatedly and systematically failed to provide
women suffering pregnancy complications . . with the emergency care required by EMTALA
[Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act] and the Rehabilitation Act").
171.

See supra Section II.B.2.

172. State attorneys general play an increasingly important role in enforcing legal and
regulatory requirements in the health care sector. They regularly take action against nonprofit
hospitals' failure to satisfy requirements for tax exemption, violation of health care fraud and
abuse laws, violation of Medicare and Medicaid conditions of participations, and antitrust
violations in the context of hospital mergers.
173. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 1275-76 (finding that laws in thirty-seven states explicitly
establish immunity from civil liability for individual and/or institutional health care providers
who refuse to participate in abortion, and that laws in an additional nine states could be
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establish a "conscience defense to malpractice," immunizing doctors and hospitals
from civil liability for any third-party harms their refusals might cause. 7 4
This type of civil immunity is a near anomaly in the world of federal
antidiscrimination and religious protection laws. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of religion but says nothing
about liability to those who might be injured as a result of employee
accommodation.17 5 The Americans with Disabilities Act is similarly silent on the
issue of liability for harms resulting from employee accommodation.
When compared to state anti-discrimination and religious protection laws,
abortion conscience laws also seem to offer far greater protections from civil liability.
For example, state immunization laws that grant religious exemptions are silent as to
whether parents who refuse to immunize their children might be liable to injured
third parties.176 Health care decision-making laws applicable in end-of-life contexts
are somewhat more varied. In some states, immunity from civil liability is granted
only if a provider successfully transfers the patient to another provider willing to
perform the service. 77 Other states ostensibly immunize providers from civil
liability, but only where the provider has acted "in accordance with generally
accepted health care standards," language that seems to indicate that providers would
face civil liability if they committed malpractice.178 Moreover, in cases where a
provider refuses to comply with a patient request to discontinue life-sustaining

interpreted to establish such liability).
174. Id. at 1258 (noting that many states' health care conscience laws create "a 'conscience
defense' to malpractice which immunizes health care providers from civil liability, even when
their conscience-driven refusal to provide information or treatment violates the standard of
care").
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The only reference to liability is in enforcement actions by
aggrieved employees when employers violate the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2018).
176.

See Anthony Ciolli, Mandatory School Vaccinations: The Role of Tort Law, 81 YALE

J. BIOLOGY MED. 129 (2008) (arguing that in states with religious exemptions, tort liability
may provide a mechanism for compensating victims).
177. See supra Section II.C.
178. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-410(a) (establishing that a health care provider
or institution "acting in good faith and in accordance with generally accepted health care
standards . . is not subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline" for declining to comply
with an individual health care instruction or health care decision for reasons of conscience);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4740 (West 2009) (same). In California, the requirement that providers
comply with "generally accepted health care standards" was added by the legislature shortly
after a California court's decision interpreting the existing civil immunity provision broadly
in Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (1999). CAL. PROB. CODE §
4740 (West 2009) (added by Health Care Decisions Law, ch. 658, § 39, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv.
A.B. 891). In Duarte, the court ruled in favor of a hospital that was sued for failing to "comply
with the family's request to terminate use of a respirator or to transfer the woman to a health
care provider who would comply." 85 Cal. Rptr. at 522. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury concerning a physician's duty of care when presented with
a request to withdraw life-sustaining medical care on the grounds that the state's HCDA
established full civil immunity. Id. at 527.
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treatment, courts are increasingly recognizing that, regardless of statutory language,
patients are entitled to a remedy for the delay. 7 9
The only other situation where state legislatures have significantly limited the
liability of those granted religious or conscientious exemptions to generally
applicable laws appears to be in the context of child medical neglect. While not
discussed in the Sections above, these laws generally grant parents immunity from
charges of medical neglect if they use modes of religious healing rather than
conventional medical treatment.180 They were passed as a result of a federal policy
in place from 1974 to 1983 that conditioned federal funding for child protective
services on passage of state religious exemptions. 181 These laws have been widely
criticized as being unreasonably harmful to children. 182 Importantly, however, these
statutory exemptions sometimes limit parental decision-making rights in cases where
a child's health is seriously at risk.183 And even in cases where the statutes appear to

179.
180.

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See generally Religious Exemptions to Medical Treatment of Children in State Civil

& Criminal Cases, CHILD, http://childrenshealthcare.org/?page_id=24#Exemptions
[https://perma.cc/5L7Z-Z7AT] (surveying state laws providing religious exemptions to
providing medical care for children, and noting that thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have religious exemptions in their civil codes on child abuse or neglect, or failure
to report; fifteen states have religious defenses to felony crimes against children; and twelve
states have religious defenses to misdemeanors); Baruch Gitlin, Parents' CriminalLiability
for Failure To ProvideMedicalAttention to Their Children, 118 A.L.R.5th 253 § 18(a) (2004)
(identifying cases where courts considering religious exemptions in medical neglect statutes
have rejected religious defenses to criminal liability); Doriane Lambelet Coleman,
Religiously-Motivated Medical Neglect, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 359 (2016)
(surveying religiously motived medical neglect laws); Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a
Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can this Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2

QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73 (1998) (identifying exemptions and limitations from providing
medical care to children, and providing a history and critique of statutes).
181. Coleman, supra note 180, at 378-79. In 1983, Congress withdrew the mandate to
provide religious exemptions, but few states subsequently revised their statutes. Id.
182. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 180 (arguing that children's rights to medical care should
be protected without exception for religious belief); Janna C. Merrick, SpiritualHealing, Sick
Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269
(2003) (arguing that religious healing exemptions do not protect the best interests of the child
and create inequities in the healthcare system, and recommending that exemptions from
providing medical care be eliminated when the child's condition is a serious threat to his or
her health or life); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs ofParentalFree Exercise: Striking
a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment,
18 PEPP. L. REV. 319 (1991) (advocating for repeal of religious exemptions in order to "prevent

the unnecessary deaths of children who suffer from disease that is readily and effectively
treatable by medical science").
183. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West 2015) (prohibiting a finding of child
endangerment "for the sole reason" that a parent or guardian "depends upon spiritual means
alone through prayer . .. for the treatment or cure of disease," but establishing that "medical
care shall be provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child" and in
cases of "communicable diseases and sanitary matters"); Walker v. Superior Ct., 763 P.2d
852, 865-66 (Cal. 1988) (holding that spiritual treatment exemption was based on a
willingness to accommodate religious practice when children do not face physical harm).
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provide absolute protections, courts have nevertheless been willing to deviate from
the statutory text and impose sanctions on parents. 184 For example, most courts have
held that religious exemptions from parental obligations to provide medical care do
not protect parents from criminal liability. 18 5 Other courts have held such statutory
exemptions unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 186 Furthermore, medical
neglect laws allow the state to step in to protect children when parents are unwilling
to do so, with the clear intent of preventing third-party harm, 187 an option that is not
available when considering abortion refusal laws. In the abortion context, the state
cannot step in to provide needed care to patients, as only medical providers are
licensed to provide abortions-but it could grant a civil remedy when patients are
harmed.
As I have argued elsewhere, fundamental principles of American law and policy
dictate that even deeply rooted rights can and should be restricted when their exercise

184. "Legislatures might be willing to grant carte blanche exemptions from child neglect
laws, vaccination requirements, and the like. But judges presented with those same claims
under RFRA and similar laws almost never do." Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation,
the Establishment Clause, and Third-PartyHarm, 86 U. CHI. L. REv. 871, 940 (2019).
185. Gitlin, supra note 180, § 2(a) ("Although parents charged with failing to provide
medical care to their children often claim a defense based on their religious beliefs, this defense
has almost universally been rejected by the courts .... "); see, e.g., State v. McKown, 475
N.W.2d 63, 65-68 (Minn. 1991) (holding that that the spiritual healing exception to the child
neglect statute did not apply to manslaughter charges); Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695,
697-98 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that parents who used spiritual means to treat a
child's illness could use that as a defense to a charge of first-degree manslaughter, but not
second-degree manslaughter); Walker, 763 P.2d at 852 (finding that state penal code's
exemption for parents relying on prayer treatment did not create an express exemption from
felony prosecution); Commonwealthv. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 609 (Mass. 1993) (holding
that the state's spiritual treatment provision did not foreclose an involuntary manslaughter
charge); State v. Crank, 486 S.W.3d 15, 15 (Tenn. 2015) (holding that religious exception to
child abuse, neglect, and endangerment charges is not unconstitutionally vague); Bergmann v.
State, 486 N.E.2d 653, 656-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that jury was entitled to reject
the parents' religious-treatment defense as a question of fact even though the defense was set
forth in the child neglect statute, and noting that the defense only appeared in the neglect-ofdependent statute, but not in the reckless homicide statute).
186. State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 933-38 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) (holding that
religious exemption to child endangerment statute was unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Stone,
378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1980) (holding that religious exemption in state immunization
statute violates Equal Protection Clause).
187. See Coleman, supra note 180, at 379-84 (noting that such statues do not preclude
Child Protective Services or the courts from acting to protect the child, particularly where the
situation is life-threatening, and describing current law as focusing on protecting children, not
punishing parents.); In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302, 1305-06 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
statutory language relating to a parent's decision to choose treatment by prayer did not mean
that the state was powerless to intervene when a child's life was seriously jeopardized); In re
Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 427-29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the state can act on
behalf of the child in consenting to necessary treatment where child neglect statute did not
establish an exemption for religious healing).
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is likely to cause serious harm to third parties. 188 State and federal antidiscrimination
and religious accommodation laws offer a variety of approaches for how these
interests might be balanced, and legislators seeking to amend abortion conscience
laws would be well-advised to consider these approaches. But at the very least,
legislators should be on notice that in almost no other context are conscientious
refusers granted immunity from civil liability when their refusals harm third parties.
This is why I have previously argued that state laws should not limit patients'
remedies when a health care provider's conscience-driven refusal violates the
standard of care and causes injury. 189 Eliminating civil immunity provisions in
abortion conscience laws would significantly reduce the burdens on patients
impacted by provider refusals without compelling providers to act against their
conscientious beliefs.
CONCLUSION

State laws that establish absolute conscience protections for health care providers
are policy outliers. Unlike other state and federal laws aimed at protecting people
from discrimination, abortion conscience laws are drafted in such a way that they
impose unilateral burdens on third parties. These laws ought to strike a more
appropriate balance between protecting conscience-driven health care providers and
protecting third parties, like patients and employers. This Article proposes that
legislators considering changes to state health care conscience laws incorporate
"undue hardship" and "direct threat" limitations, modeled after those in the Civil
Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Furthermore, because the civil
immunity provisions in abortion conscience laws are an anomaly among state and
federal antidiscrimination laws, these laws should not immunize refusing providers
from liability if their actions violate the standard of care and cause patient injury.
Taking these steps would more effectively balance the state's interest in protecting
health care providers against its interest in protecting third parties who might be
harmed by provider refusals.

188.

Nadia N. Sawicki, DisentanglingConscience Protections, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14,

19 (2018).
189.

See Sawicki, supra note 2.

